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adversary’s preference for any particular type of successor machines. Optionally, 
successors’ identities can be kept anonymous from selecting replicas, forcing the 
adversary to discover first the new replicas’ identities before launching attacks. 
Practicability of the proposed strategy is established in two ways. Architecture and 
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selection and state-transfer are outlined for the three replacement schemes proposed. Using analytical estimations 
and simulations, the replacement schemes are shown to be effective in sustaining tolerance capability by 
comparing them with a proactive recovery scheme that is assisted by an idealized Wormhole. With the availability 
and affordability of redundant machines, proactive replacement is a useful tolerance-sustaining strategy either on 
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Abstract 
 
 
We propose and study proactive replacement as a 
strategy for ensuring that the number of intrusions 
does not exceed the design threshold within an 
intrusion-tolerant system. State machine replicas 
periodically replace themselves, en masse, by selecting 
a successor set from a large server farm housing spare 
machines that have been cleaned-up subsequent to any 
prior use. Selection is random to thwart adversary’s 
preference for any particular type of successor 
machines. Optionally, successors’ identities can be 
kept anonymous from selecting replicas, forcing the 
adversary to discover first the new replicas’ identities 
before launching attacks. Practicability of the 
proposed strategy is established in two ways. 
Architecture and combinations of well-known 
protocols for selection and state-transfer are outlined 
for the three replacement schemes proposed. Using 
analytical estimations and simulations, the 
replacement schemes are shown to be effective in 
sustaining tolerance capability by comparing them 
with a proactive recovery scheme that is assisted by an 
idealized Wormhole. With the availability and 
affordability of redundant machines, proactive 
replacement is a useful tolerance-sustaining strategy 
either on its own or in combination with its orthogonal 
counter-part, proactive recovery. 
 
Keywords: Intrusion Tolerance, Replication, Byzantine 
Agreement, State Machines, Asynchronous Ordering, 
Proactive Recovery. 
 
‘Time is what we want most, without it we can do 
nothing and about which we ought to be more 
solicitous’ - William Penn in Fruits of Solitude.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One way of being more solicitous about time in 
dependable computing has been to deploy and exploit 
spatial redundancy, typically involving commercial off 
the shelf (COTS) components. With falling hardware 
cost, COTS redundancy (e.g., hiring a server farm) is 
becoming increasingly more affordable. These 
observations form the main driving forces behind our 
approach to solving the ‘second-level’ problem of 
sustaining the tolerance capability of an intrusion-
tolerant system against a determined adversary.  
Generally, intrusion-tolerant systems are built to 
tolerate simultaneous presence of at most f intrusions, 
with an assumption or understanding that measures are 
in place to ensure that the number of intrusions present 
in the system not exceed f over its life-time. When f is 
exceeded, however, the f–tolerant system breaks and is 
said to have suffered the fatal intrusion.  
Avoiding the fatal intrusion in an f intrusion-
tolerant system has been an active area of research [2, 
3]. Specifically, a series of publications by Sousa et. al. 
[10 - 12] has established several key, important results. 
According to these findings, difficulties, often not 
solvable, arise if one attempts to preserve some of the 
assumptions made in solving the first-level problem of 
building an f-tolerant system itself. The latter involves 
two major assumptions: (i) an intruded node can 
behave in an arbitrary or Byzantine manner [7]; and, 
(ii) processing delays by correct nodes and message 
delays between two correct nodes cannot have a known 
upper bound. Whatever the value assigned to the 
bound, however realistically arrived at, will be violated 
because the adversary is aware of it and hence will 
successfully work to invalidate it. Assumption (ii) is 
typically referred to as asynchronous delay model, as 
opposed to synchronous one where the upper bound on 
delays is assumed to be known. 
Both assumptions, in some sense, are non-
assumptions. The first, even if restricted to 
authenticated Byzantine behavior, makes guaranteed 
detection of malicious behavior infeasible. So, reactive 
strategy of detection and replacement is ineffective in 
preventing fatal intrusion occurring in the f-tolerant 
system. This has led to proactive recovery approach 
whereby each node in the system is periodically taken 
out of the system without stopping rest of the system, 
is recovered, and re-introduced with up to date system 
state; recovery nullifies effects of any past intrusions 
and the number of intruded nodes in the system drops 
when a corrupt node is recovered. 
One of the key results in [10, 12] is that proactive 
recovery cannot prevent fatal intrusion when system is 
asynchronous – adversary delays recovery through 
stealth time attacks and makes the number of 
recovering nodes exceed the threshold. We also 
observe that the above result holds in our approach 
described here, prompting a generalization that 
prevention of fatal intrusions cannot be guaranteed in 
an asynchronous system, whatever the means or 
approach taken. Though this is not our main objective, 
we address the question of how minimally 
synchronous the system can be made for eliminating 
fatal intrusion.   
We associate a synchronous system with minimal 
progress requirement (∆, ν): at least ν distributed 
computations, each involving full message exchanges, 
need to complete in a duration or epoch of length ∆. 
Large ∆ and small ν impose the most minimal progress 
requirement. Proactive recovery requires (∆, ν=⎡n/g⎤) 
where ∆ is the proactive recovery period and n is the 
number of nodes in the f-tolerant system which recover 
g at a time. ν increases with n which increases three-
fold with f.  
In the approach pursued here, nodes of an f-tolerant 
system, for every ∆, replace themselves en masse, by 
selecting, and state-transferring to, successor nodes 
from a server farm that houses recovered nodes. 
Replacement requires three synchronous executions of 
Byzantine agreement during ∆, i.e., ν is fixed at 3 and 
the bound on message delays is influenced by f (not n).  
Proactive recovery requires Worm-hole abstraction 
to enforce (∆, ⎡n/g⎤) progress and Worm-hole 
implementation embedding a trusted and timely 
distributed system into an intrusion-prone and untimely 
system [14, 15]. While the component distributed 
systems can be bought separately, having one 
embedded into another while maintaining necessary 
isolation is hard. In our approach, proactive 
replacement can be easily achieved through well-
known, software-implementable agreement and order 
protocols and secret-sharing schemes. 
This paper makes four contributions in presenting 
and evaluating a novel approach to sustainable f-
tolerance: algorithms necessary for self-replacement of 
nodes are identified (Section 3); anonymous 
replacement schemes developed hide the actual server 
nodes from adversary, thus delaying attacks on server 
nodes (Section 3.2); expected lifetime before fatal 
intrusion is analytically estimated for replacement 
schemes and for an idealized version of Worm-holed 
proactive recovery (Section 4); and, using these 
estimations and also simulations, sustainability of 
replacement schemes are demonstrated (Section 5).   
Next section describes the system model and 
characterizes the adversary considered. For space 
reasons, we assume familiarity with state machine 
replication [8, 9] is generally assumed and the progress 
requirement of synchronous systems discussed earlier 
is not defined further. 
 
2. System Model 
 
The system consists of a replicated sub-system S of 
n nodes which maintains service availability despite at 
most f intruded nodes within it, a name server NS 
advertising the service, and a server farm SF with a 
capacity for housing Nc, Nc > 3n, intrusion-free spare 
nodes. Outside the system are networked-clients 
accessing services of S and a persistent adversary A 
trying to exploit vulnerabilities within S to achieve a 
simultaneous presence of more than f intrusions.  If A 
manages to achieve that, S fails and is termed to have 
suffered the fatal intrusion. Preventing this fatal 
occurrence is the design objective. 
Clients bind to S using NS and access S in the 
traditional request-response manner; multiple clients 
may concurrently submit their requests. We assume 
that S is implemented using the well-known state 
machine replication (SMR) approach [8,9] and the 
SMR requirement of identically ordering the client 
requests is met using any asynchronous protocol (e.g., 
[3]) that tolerates at most f authenticated Byzantine 
faults. Hence, n = 3f+1 is assumed throughout. 
Implementation of S makes use of public-key 
cryptosystem that enables correct (intrusion-free) 
nodes to generate non-forgeable message signatures 
and authenticate signed messages. These procedures 
are assumed to be secure. 
Referring the reader to literature for finer details on 
SMR (e.g., clients voting over any set of (f+1) identical 
and authentic responses) and asynchronous order 
agreement, we will regard the following to hold, so 
long as S has at least n-f= 2f+1 correct replicas: 
(S1) a valid client request generates a unique 
response with verifiable (cryptographic) evidence 
affirming its correctness, 
(S2) a correct node checkpoints its state (CP), after 
having processed a fixed number of requests, together 
with verifiable evidence indicting correctness of CP, 
(S3) a correct node irreversibly decides on a 
processing order for every valid request, together with 
verifiable evidence justifying that decision, and 
(S4) if at least (f+1) correct nodes endorse an order 
for a request, then some correct node may have 
decided, or may yet to decide, on the endorsed order 
for that request. 
The state of a replica node is therefore a 3-tuple 
{CP, O, E}, where O and E are the sequences of 
ordered and endorsed requests since CP and the last 
entry of O, respectively. 
Name-server NS supplies, on request, the address of 
nodes of S for clients to submit requests. It is 
implemented with n-fold node replication managed in 
SMR style (like S) and offers a read-only service to 
clients. 
Server-farm SF maintains a large group of network-
connected nodes as ‘warm spares’ ready to host 
applications. When a spare hosts applications, it is 
‘active’ and leaves SF. Similarly, an active node can 
choose to become a spare and (re-)join SF. However, it 
must undergo a recovery procedure between ceasing to 
be active and joining SF, which involves reinstallation 
of OS and application software and generation of fresh 
cryptographic keys. 
Recovery thus eradicates all effects of any intrusion 
that might have occurred while the node was active. 
When a recovered node becomes active again, A has to 
expend time and effort in launching a series of attacks 
to gain intrusion, even if A had intruded when the node 
was active in the past and no vulnerability has been 
patched meanwhile.  
The farm gateway (GW) inspects all messages 
addressed to a spare and allows only those from nodes 
of NS. It also maintains the membership list of SF 
which is written by (intrusion-free) spares as they join 
and leave SF. GW is also implemented by n nodes in 
SMR style. Membership list in GW can be read by 
(nodes of) S. 
A read/write request to an SMR unit is responded 
to/acted on only after a vote on requests received and 
ordering of the voted request (which is one of f+1 
identical and authentic ones received). Any response 
sent by an SMR unit is accepted at the receiving end 
only after a vote. An SMR unit may be requested to 
forward a message to another SMR unit. The former 
may not perform a vote or ordering but the latter SMR 
unit accepts the forwarded message only after a vote. If 
a fatal intrusion has not occurred in any of the 
interacting SMR units, the states of correct nodes 
involved cannot be corrupt due to this interaction.  
We make the following assumptions: 
(1) Spare nodes in SF do not crash and remain 
intrusion-free; their clocks are kept synchronised 
within a known bound, ε; 
(2) At any moment, the absolute difference 
between the clock readings of correct nodes within S 
does not exceed ε+κ∆, where κ is the known bound on 
the absolute difference between the running rates of 
correct nodes’ clocks;  
(3)  The communication and processing delays 
within S are asynchronous for ordering and processing 
client requests, and synchronous with (∆,3) progress 
for executing proactive replacement schemes; and, 
(4) Fatal intrusions cannot occur in GW or NS. 
Assumption (1) is justified as SF is closed to 
outside interaction. Assumptions underlying (1) are: 
communication between spare nodes and the correct 
nodes of GW or NS is synchronous and a crashed spare 
is swiftly detected and removed from the membership 
list in GW. Assumption about κ in (2) is standard and 
(2) follows from it and (1).  The first part of (3) is 
common and the second part is essential for proactive 
schemes to be guaranteed to be effective [12]. (4) is to 
simplify presentation , though the replacement scheme 
described here can be applied to GW and to NS with 
client-level difficulties.  
 
2.1. Adversary and Node Life Cycle 
 
All nodes in our system possess some vulnerability. 
When the system starts up, A has some initial 
knowledge on node vulnerabilities. As per this 
knowledge, a node has its vulnerability either unknown 
(U) or known, and hence vulnerable (V), to A. When 
each node at the system start-up time is a V-node, A is 
considered to be fully informed at the very start.  
A is also considered to be a learning adversary who 
learns in two ways. His knowledge on node 
vulnerability grows with time - independent of our 
system (independent learning). This means that if A is 
not fully informed at the system start, he can 
eventually become fully informed, without ever 
launching any attack on system nodes. Secondly, if a 
U-node is within S (executing client requests), A can 
convert it to a V-node by launching successful attacks 
(attack-based learning).  
A V-node must be within S for A to be able to 
exploit its vulnerabilities; when A succeeds, intrusion 
occurs and the node becomes an exploited node (X-
node) and is no longer correct. From A’s perspective, a 
node’s state can therefore be represented as a 2-tuple 
{0/1, U/V/X}, where the first field is ‘1’ if the node is 
within S and visible to A or ‘0’ otherwise. When 
outside S, it will be undergoing recovery or be in SF 
after completing recovery which converts an X-node to 
V-node. Figure 1 shows the possible transitions of a 
node and their description here will classify them into 
three groups.  
All horizontal transitions from left to right (e.g., 
{1,U} to {1,V}) are under the control of A. Learning 
and exploiting a vulnerability involves launching a 
successful series of atomic attacks, each in turn, 
involves choosing the most effective strategy out of 
several possibilities. For example, A may have to revert 
back to an earlier state in the attack process and deploy 
a different strategy from that state [6].  
 
 
Figure 1. Node Life Cycle with Recovery. 
Secondly, the right-to-left horizontal transition 
refers to the node’s vulnerabilities (known to A) being 
patched by the administrator. Finally, the transitions 
that involve vertical movements model the effects of 
various measures that can be put in place for avoiding 
fatal intrusions.   
In reactive recovery approach, an intruded node is 
detected and replaced by a new node with vulnerability 
known/unknown to A. This can be seen as an exploited 
and detected node transiting from {1, X} to {0, V} and 
then from {0, V} to {1, V}; if the new node replacing 
the detected node is an U-node, then the sequence of 
transitions {1, X} → {0, V} → {0, U} → {1, U} will 
represent fault detection and removal and subsequent 
reconfiguration of S. Detection of malicious behavior 
cannot be guaranteed to be precise, so false positives 
can occur. This is implied by upward transitions from 
(1,V) or (1,U).  
A proactive approach divides the lifetime of S into 
epochs, each of ∆ duration (say). Proactive recovery 
involves a node in S being taken-out (one or more 
times) in each epoch for a (total) fraction R of ∆ for 
recovery and then re-introduced into S with correct 
service state (each time). So, transition from {1, 
X/V/U} represents a node entering recovery, and that 
from {0, V} → {0, U} vulnerabilities being patched 
during recovery.  
In proactive replacement, the topic of this paper, an 
upward transition occurs at the end of each epoch, and 
a downward one if the node is selected for S from SF.  
Moreover, anonymous replacement schemes (to be 
described here) will keep some nodes in S concealed 
from clients and therefore from A. Concealment allows 
a correct node to be in (0, U) or (0, V) while it is 
operating within S, until concealment is breached or 
relinquished. (An X-node admits no concealment.) 
Assumptions and Definitions. In this paper, patching 
of vulnerability is not considered, though a detected 
vulnerability can be patched as a part of off-line 
recovery process which, as we will see, can proceed 
unhurried for one ∆. The epoch-length ∆ is taken to be 
the ‘unit-time’, as we are primarily interested in 
studying the expected life-time of S before the fatal 
intrusion occurs. 
D1: Probability that the transition {1, U} → {1, V} 
occurs in a unit-time is denoted as α; that is, a U-node 
in state ‘1’ becomes a V-node over a unit time with 
probability α. 
D2: Probability that the transition {1, V} → {1, X} 
occurs in a unit-time is denoted as β; that is, a V-node 
in state ‘1’ becomes an X-node over a unit time with 
probability β. 
D3: Probability that the transition {0, U} → {0, V} 
occurs in a unit-time is denoted as χ. 
Remarks.  
The definitions are independent of the unit-times. 
This ‘memory-less’ aspect leads to the assertion that 
inverse of these discrete event probabilities are the 
exponential means for the respective transitions in 
continuous time. The assumption of exponential nature 
is consistent with the general body of work on the 
evaluation of intrusion tolerance [5, 6]. 
Since α, β and χ are probabilities, their inverses are 
obviously larger than 1 which is the unit-time as well 
as the epoch-length ∆. So, in continuous time, the 
exponential means are larger than ∆: 
1/α > ∆, 1/β > ∆ and1/χ > ∆. 
This is necessary; otherwise, A becomes extremely 
powerful and can turn, within one epoch: each U-node 
in the system to a V-node; concurrently, each V-node 
into an X-node. This means that the fatal intrusion 
occurs by the end of the second epoch in the lifetime of 
S, even if all nodes are initially U-nodes. Against such 
an adversary, sustainable intrusion resilience is not 
attainable, if ∆ cannot be meaningfully reduced. (See 
also [12] for details.) 
 χ < α, because the latter indicates the adversary’s 
ability to learn vulnerabilities by both ways where as 
the former refers to independent learning only.  
{0,U} {0,V} 
{1,U} {1,V} {1,X}
Assumption: A transition from {1, U} to {1, X} 
cannot occur in a unit-time; i.e., α×β is assumed to be 
negligibly small.   
3. Proactive Replacement 
 
The lifetime of the service implemented by S is 
divided into epochs of ∆ duration and all constituents 
of S are replaced at the end of each epoch, in a 
seamless manner. The new constituents of S are drawn 
from SF, while the replaced ones join SF after 
recovery. At a next level, machines of SF themselves 
can be replaced after several epochs, and this is not 
considered here. 
We model proactive replacement as: S is made up of 
different sets of n, n = 3f+1, machines – one set Si for 
each epoch i; ∀i ≥ 1: Si ∩ Si+1 = {}. The constituents of 
first S1 are selected randomly from SF by the system 
administrator who supplies them with the initial 
service state and a large prime number, and informs NS 
of their identities. Following this initial set-up, each 
subsequent replacement is entirely managed by the 
system itself provided that no Si suffers fatal intrusion 
until epoch i ends.  
Self-managed proactive replacement requires three 
essential issues to be addressed. Selected nodes of Si, i 
≥ 1, prepare themselves for SMR processing 
(preparation).  By the end of the epoch, they randomly 
select the composition of Si+1 (random selection).  
Once Si+1 completes its preparation, Si provides service 
state to Si+1 (state transfer). 
Preparation. Nodes of Si generate public-key 
cryptosystem keys, register the public-keys with NS 
and leave SF informing GW. They are assumed to 
remain correct until the moment they register their 
keys and depart from SF, at which point GW updates 
the membership list and NS starts binding clients to Si. 
Hence, preparation stage, once initiated, always 
completes in the intrusion-free environment of SF. 
Random Selection. Nodes of Si have to select the 
nodes of Si+1 by the end of the epoch. Some of them 
may have been intruded meanwhile, and those nodes 
may attempt to influence for more nodes with known 
and easy-to-exploit vulnerabilities to be selected. To 
thwart such attempts, selection ought to be random.  
Random selection can be achieved by nodes of Si 
executing the distributed lottery agreement (DLA) 
protocol [1] that has the following properties: (i) all 
correct nodes of Si decide identically on L ∈{0, 1, .., 
m-1};  and, (ii) for every valid initial configuration, the 
probability of L= j is 1/m, 0 ≤ j< m.  
A single execution of DLA can be easily extended to 
decide n lottery outcomes in parallel, each being drawn 
out of the sequence numbers assigned to spares in the 
membership list maintained by GW. For a DLA 
execution to be tolerant of f intruded nodes, the 
requirement is that there must be at least (2f+1) nodes 
and Si has surplus redundancy of (3f+1) nodes which 
can make execution efficient (in terms of messages).  
DLA protocol of [1] imposes two requirements. 
Nodes must have a large, agreed prime number which 
the administrator supplies to S1. (Note: the prime 
number is public and does not have to be a secret.) 
Secondly, it requires three (sequential) executions of 
synchronous Byzantine Agreement (BA) [7]. To 
facilitate this, we propose that the nodes of Si start 
executing DLA at the start of the epoch itself (in 
parallel to ordering and servicing requests) and this 
setting permits the required synchrony with progress 
being (∆, 3). Moreover, one of the BA executions is 
used (in parallel with DLA execution) for nodes to 
propose, and then agree on, a large prime that can be 
supplied to the newly-chosen nodes of Si+1 at the end of 
the epoch. To increase efficiency, the surplus 
redundancy of Si can be used to run non-authenticated 
versions of BA protocols. 
State Transfer. At the end of the epoch, the following 
four steps are carried out: 
1) Nodes of Si inform NS of the composition of 
Si+1 and the agreed prime number. They reject new 
client requests. 
2) NS, after voting the information sent by Si, 
instructs the nodes selected for Si+1 to prepare to be 
active in S and also supplies each of them with (i) 
identities of nodes both Si and Si+1, and the prime 
number. It no longer binds clients to Si. As soon as all 
nodes of Si+1 have registered their keys with it, NS 
starts binding client requests to Si+1. 
Clients send their requests to all replicas of an SMR 
unit. When NS (f+1)-votes information sent in step 1), 
at least one correct node in Si has observed the end of 
epoch, with others observing it within at most (ε+κ∆) 
time. Interacting clients receiving (f+1) rejections from 
Si should contact NS and bind with Si+1. 
3)  A prepared node of Si+1 requests the out-going 
of nodes Si for state information. On receiving such a 
request (not subjecting it to a vote), a node of Si+1, 
which has executed step 1) above sends its state 
information which comprises of {CP, O, E} and all 
client requests received but not yet endorsed. Each 
incoming node awaits state information from at least 
(n-f) outgoing nodes, none of which is subject to a 
vote. When Si has at least (n-f) correct nodes, this 
waiting must terminate.  
4) Based on (n-f) pieces of state information 
received, nodes of Si+1 agree on {CP, O} and a set of 
unordered client requests, subject to:  
(i) any request processed by at least one correct 
out-going node is present either in the agreed O and 
has the same order or is reflected in the agreed CP; 
(ii)  any request received by at least (f+1) correct 
out-going nodes is present in the agreed set of 
unordered client requests. 
These two conditions need to be met under the 
restrictive ambiguities that at least f out of (2f+1) nodes 
that supplied state information to an incoming node 
may not be correct, and that incoming nodes may not 
receive state information from the same set of (2f+1) 
out-going nodes. This is exactly being achieved during 
a ‘view-change’ in a coordinator based, asynchronous, 
Byzantine tolerant order protocol, such as [3].  (For a 
quick overview, see [4]). The required predicates are 
stated as (S3) and (S4) in Section 2.  
A view change is triggered in [3] when enough 
nodes suspect that the current coordinator is faulty. The 
only difference is that, in a view-change, potential 
suppliers of state information and the actors who act on 
it are the same; in state transfer, suppliers are outgoing 
nodes and the actors the incoming ones. However, in 
both cases, actors as well as suppliers are 3f+1 in total 
(with at most f of them being Byzantine faulty) and the 
restrictions imposed on the state information that the 
actors have to work on, are identical. Hence, it can be 
asserted that a view-change algorithm, as in [3], 
enables incoming nodes to build correct service state to 
start SMR processing. 
3.1. Implementation Considerations 
  
Algorithms sketched above are directly supported by 
implementations reported in the literature, except 
perhaps for the DLA protocol. DLA solves a problem 
harder than agreement or consensus where corrupt 
nodes can influence the nature of (identical) decision 
reached. (This is perhaps obvious as DLA requires BA 
protocol.). In addition to BA protocol, DLA uses (f+1) 
secret sharing [13]. Both secret-sharing and BA have 
solutions that are implementable. 
Implementation of DLA assumes synchrony with (∆, 
3) progress capability. Let d be the assumed bound on 
processing delays in, and communication delays 
between, correct nodes during DLA execution. ∆ is 
usually in hours, say one hour. So, each of the three 
executions of BA needs to complete within 20 minutes; 
each also has (f+1) full message exchange rounds. (∆, 
3) progress holds for the assumed d, if (d+ε+κ∆) < 
20/(f+1) minutes.  
Standard value assigned to κ is 2×10-6; so, κ∆ = 
12×10-5 minutes. Assuming that ε+κ∆ < 1 minute, the 
largest value that can be assigned to d should be 
smaller than (19-f)/(f+1) minutes, which is 9 and 5.67 
minutes when f=1 and f=2 respectively. For ∆ = 15 
minutes and f=1, (∆, 3) progress holds if d < 90 
seconds. Finally, assuming that nodes complete 
recovery within ∆ time, the capacity of SF: Nc > 3n. 
3.2. Anonymous Proactive Replacement 
  
In the replacement scheme described above, clients 
access the nodes of Si directly and the nodes’ identities 
are a public knowledge. Therefore, the nodes are 
exposed to attacks from the very start of the epoch. 
Suppose that the presence of some nodes in Si is kept 
not known to A. Exploitation of these nodes is 
extremely difficult since their vulnerability also 
remains unknown. Using this idea, the schemes 
described here attempt to conceal from clients the 
identities of nodes that maintain the service state and 
process client requests, and thereby minimize 
intrusions of state-preserving, processing nodes. To 
achieve concealment, additional nodes will be used for 
forwarding requests to processing nodes and responses 
back to clients. 
Devising these schemes must address two additional 
issues. The first one is obvious: keeping the identities 
of processing nodes hidden from clients (concealed 
placement). The second arises from the requirement 
that outgoing nodes select the nodes of Si+1 for self-
managed replacement, and the possibility that the 
former might contain intruded nodes. So, the 
processing nodes of Si+1 must be selected without 
involving the outgoing nodes directly (concealed 
selection). Replacement that has both the concealment 
properties is termed as anonymous. Two anonymous 
schemes are proposed; the scheme discussed earlier is 
distinguished as direct access and is denoted as DA(n), 
indicating the total number of nodes used. 
Concealed Placement. Each Si is made up of τ, τ > 1, 
tiers, Ti,1, Ti,2, .. Ti,j, Ti,τ, 1≤ j ≤ τ, and τ is not a secret.   
Ti,1 masquerades as ‘the’ Si to clients, but simply 
forwards their requests to Ti,2, and Ti,2 to Ti,3 and so on. 
Requests forwarded by Ti,j, j < τ, are accepted in Ti,j+1 
after a vote. Additionally, Ti,τ−1 orders clients’ requests 
and forwards the decided order together with the 
requests. Ti,τ processes the ordered requests coming 
from Ti,τ−1 and hence it alone has the service state. 
Responses to clients are handled similarly in the 
opposite direction: Ti,j, j<τ, votes on responses from 
Ti,j+1 and signs the voted response which is forwarded 
to Ti,j-1 as though the forwarded response is locally 
computed; Ti,1 forwards its signed responses directly to 
clients.  
Each Ti,j is an SMR unit which, for brevity, is 
assumed to contain nj nodes, nj = 3fj+1 and fj > 0, 
though the tiers other than Ti,τ−1 can have just 2fj+1 
nodes since they do not have to order client requests. 
Nodes of Ti,j know only the identities of nodes in Ti,j-1 
(when j>1) and those in Ti,j+1 (when j<τ). Ti,j suffers a 
fatal intrusion when the (fj+1)th intrusion occurs in it. 
Defensive Measures and Fail Condition: A initially 
knows only the identities of Ti,1 and his exploitation 
attempts are initially restricted to the nodes of Ti,1. A 
can know the identities of nodes of Ti,j, j>1, only after 
at least one node in each previous tier, Ti,1, .., Ti,j-1, has 
been exploited. Hence, exploitation attempts at the 
processing tier Ti,τ  cannot begin until at least (τ-1) 
intrusions are achieved in the preceding tiers. The 
tiered arrangement of Si fails, when a fatal intrusion 
occurs in any of the τ tiers, since corrupt nodes of a 
fatally intruded tier can generate (f+1) identically 
incorrect responses that can pass a vote.  
Thus, the first tier remains the most vulnerable, 
requiring a larger n1. However, the tiered Si can offer 
twice the throughput compared to DA(n) since 
ordering and processing are separated. Given that the 
arrangement does not fail, nodes of Ti,τ (identical to 
those of Si in DA(n)) select Ti+1,1 which, in turn, selects 
{Ti+1,2, .. Ti+1,τ}. (Details are to follow.) 
We call this tiered arrangement Indirect Access (IA) 
scheme and denote it as IA(n1,..,nτ). Note that when 
τ=1, Ti,τ is directly accessible to clients and has to 
perform both ordering and processing of requests; 
IA(nτ=1= n) is identical to DA(n).  
A variation of IA(n1,..,nτ) will be to have hybrid 
access scheme which initially enforces indirect access 
to processing nodes and eventually (within the same 
epoch) direct access. This hybrid version will be 
denoted as HA(n1,..,nτ) and works as follows. 
The epoch is divided into τ equal, sub-epochs; at the 
end of the jth sub-epoch, 1 ≤ j < τ, Ti,j leaves Si 
informing NS and Ti,j+1 of its departure; Ti,j+1 begins the 
(j+1)th sub-epoch, registering with NS, and 
masquerades as ‘the’ server. The last, processing tier 
Ti,τ informs itself as the server at the beginning of the 
last sub-epoch. It now acts as DA(nτ) for the remaining 
duration. 
HA(n1,..,nτ) scheme emulates (τ-1) ‘mini’ 
replacements from clients’ (hence, from A’s) 
perspective. Each invokes a change of address for Si in 
NS and fresh client-binding; it can be swift as none 
requires selection or state transfer, except that when 
Ti, τ−1 (the ordering tier) departs, correct (processing) 
nodes of Ti,τ must agree on the last received order. 
Each mini-replacement is effected by requiring that the 
nodes of the departing tier send a signal that is voted at 
the next tier. Assuming that recovery completes within 
one epoch, both IA and HA schemes require the 
capacity of SF to be: Nc > 3(n1 + n2 + .. + nτ). 
Concealed Selection. Ti,τ reaches agreement over the 
ith epoch on a randomly selected set of n1 nodes (from 
SF) exactly as Si does on Si+1 in the DA(n) scheme. 
These selected nodes go on to form Ti+1,1; prior to that 
and during the preparation stage, they additionally 
agree on a set of randomly selected nodes necessary for 
building other tiers of Si+1 and instructs the selected 
nodes to prepare but to register their keys with them 
(not with NS).  
Once the nodes complete preparation, Ti+1,1 defines 
the tier-structure for Si+1, supplies the keys of a given 
tier to those in the neighboring tiers, and forwards the 
state information from Ti,τ to nodes of Ti+1,τ. After that, 
nodes of Ti+1,1 delete the identities and keys of all 
nodes except of those in Ti+1,1 and Ti+1,2.   
It is assumed that nodes of Ti+1,1 remain intrusion-
free until they delete the unwanted keys. This 
constitutes a window of vulnerability, which can be 
kept small using a centralized approach for initial tasks 
to be performed by Ti+1,1: with all nodes in Ti+1,1 being 
correct during preparation, the one with the highest 
identity in Ti+1,1  can be entrusted to select the 
remaining nodes of Si+1 , define the tier structure and 
disseminate its decision to others in Ti+1,1. This avoids 
the need for expensive agreement within in Ti+1,1 .  
Defensive Measures and Fail Condition: A tier Ti,j, 1 
≤ j ≤ τ, works in Si for the first j sub-epochs, each of 
∆/τ duration. The first tier Ti,1 is therefore open to 
attacks for ∆/τ duration only; subsequent tiers Ti,j, 2 ≤ j 
≤ τ, will be open to attacks for the duration of one sub-
epoch only, provided that Ti,j-1 suffers no intrusion 
before departing Si. HA(n1,..,nτ) scheme fails once a 
fatal intrusion occurs in any tier present in Si. 
 
4. Estimation of f-Tolerance Sustainability 
 
We analytically estimate the expected number of 
epochs before fatal intrusion occurrence for DA(n) and 
an idealized form of Worm-holed proactive recovery, 
WPR(n), scheme with n nodes. Both are explained here 
and estimations for anonymous replacement schemes 
(IA and HA) are done through simulations. Recall that 
epoch duration (∆) is a unit time step and α, β and χ 
are event probabilities in a unit time (Section 2.1). 
 
4.1. Direct-Access Proactive Replacement  
 
We model an execution of DA(n) as the 
administrator forming S1 at the first instance and Si, i > 
1, replacing Si-1 at instance i. The ith epoch, i ≥1, begins 
at the ith instance and ends at the (i+1)th instance (Fig 
2). Recall that node selection for Si, i > 1, is done by 
the nodes of Si-1 in an amortized manner during the 
epoch (i-1); moreover, nodes can take at most ∆ time to 
recover and join SF. Thus, for all i > 2, the number of 
nodes available in SF for selecting nodes of Si is Nc-2n 
= N (say),  accounting for n selecting nodes of Si-1 and 
for n recovering nodes of Si-2. The system comprising S 
and SF can be modelled as a Markov chain with states 
of the form (Vi, Vi1), where 
 Vi: total number of nodes in S∪SF whose 
vulnerabilities known to the adversary A at instance i; 
i.e., number of nodes either in (0, V) or (1, V) at i; 
 Vi1: total number of nodes with known 
vulnerabilities in S at instance i; i.e., number of nodes 
in (1, V) at i. 
We are first interested in the probability that the 
system is in state (w,y) at the (i+1)th instance given that 
it is in state (v,x) at the ith instance: 
Probability ((Vi=v, Vi1=x) → (Vi+1=w, Vi+11=y))  
=  P(v,x,w,y). 
 
v-x of N-n 
in (0,V) 
w-y of N-n 
in (0,V) 
n- x of n in (1,U) 
x of n in (1,V) 
i i+1
SF 
Epoch i 
S n- y of n in (1,U) 
y of n in (1,V) 
 
Figure 2. A State Transition in Unit Step. 
 
We will first assume that α≠0 and β = χ=0. An 
increase in Vi during the (i+1)th epoch, w-v, is due to 
some U-nodes in Si (S at ith instance) becoming V-
nodes independent of each other (see Fig. 2); so we use 
a binomial distribution with parameters (α, n-x) to 
model them. This gives us the probability of w-v nodes 
becoming vulnerable as  
                  (1 )w v n x w v
n x
w v
α α− − − + −⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ (1)
 
Referring to Fig. 2, V-nodes of Si+1 (y of them) are 
chosen from the (v-x) V-nodes of SFi and n-y of Si+1 U-
nodes are chosen from the (N-n)-(v-x) U-nodes of SFi. 
This involves choice without replacement. So, we can 
model this as a hypergeometric distribution with 
parameters (y,N-n,v-x,n). This gives us the probability 
of y V-nodes being chosen in SFi+1. 
v - x N n v x
y n y
N n
n
− − +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
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=
1 1
1 1
1 1
y n y
j j
n v x j N n v x j
y N n j N n y j
−
= =
⎛ ⎞ − + − − − + + −⎜ ⎟ − + − − − + −⎝ ⎠∏ ∏   
(2) 
Probabilities of (1) and (2) are independent of each 
other, so, letting m = N-n and k = w-v, gives  
P(v,x,w,y) =   
1 1
1 1
1 1
k n x k
y n y
j j
n n x
y k
v x j m v x j
m j m y j
α α − −
−
= =
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
− + − − + + −
+ − − + −∏ ∏
 
  for y≤min{v-x, n}, v ≤ w ≤ v+n-x, n-y ≤ N-n-v+x. (3) 
Let us allow χ ≠ 0. This means that c nodes in SFi 
can transit from (0, U) to (0,V) and p nodes in Si transit 
from (1,U) to (1,V) during the (i+1)th epoch such that 
such that p+c = w-v, 0 ≤ p ≤ n-x, 0 ≤ c ≤ N-n-v+x. After 
some algebra based on (3) and letting r = x – n –v, 
P(v,x,w,y) =      
min{ , }
(1 )
(1 )
c N r w v
w v c w c r c
c=w+r
N r c
n x
w v c
v - x+c N r c
N r y n y
N nc
n
α α χ
χ
= + −
− − + −
+ −
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∑
 
(4) 
 
Finally, let us allow β ≠ 0, recalling that the 
transitions (0,V) to (0,X) and (1,U) to (1,X) cannot both 
occur in one unit step. So, if x < f in Si, then fatal 
intrusion cannot occur until instance (i+1). Let us 
define the function  
So, the probability of fatal intrusion in one epoch 
length from the ith instance, given that (Vi=v, Vi1=x):  
 q1(v,x) = 1( ) (1 )
d x d x d
d f
x
x f
d
δ β β= −= +
⎛ ⎞> − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑   
 
And the probability of fatal intrusion in s unit-steps 
from the ith instance, qs(v,x): 
qs(v,x)= 
(1-q1(v,x) ) × 
10 0
( , , , ) ( , )k n x n sk y P v x v k y q v k y
= −
−= = + +∑ ∑ , 
where P(v,x,v+k,y) is given by (4).   
     
The expected number of units steps before fatal 
intrusion is: 
∑∞
=1
1
11 ),(
a
a VVaq     (5) 
 
4.2. Worm-holed Proactive Recovery (WPR) 
 
This scheme is shortened as WPR(n) when n nodes 
are used within S. Each node is taken out of S within a 
unit-step for a constant number of times for recovery, 
and enters S once recovery is complete. Hence the 
identities of nodes that can be in S cannot change but 
the size of S varies due to proactive recovery.  
The total amount of time a node spends in recovery 
is a fraction R of the unit step time. During recovery, 
node is in (0, *) and the only the transition permitted is 
(0, X) → (0, V). To be consistent, patching of known 
vulnerability cannot occur during recovery; transition 
(1, U)  → (1, X) in one unit step is also forbidden. 
From resilience evaluation perspective, the values 
chosen for R and the frequency of recoveries influence 
unavailability of S as well as the stress, or lack of it, 
put on the Worm-hole.  Here, we explain the rationale 
for the model chosen for a 4-node S: WPR(4). 
Figure 3 depicts three possible ways to implement 
WPR(4). In scheme i), R is 0.25 which places the least 
stress on the Worm-hole. That is, the progress 
requirement of synchrony is (R, 1) which is equivalent 
to (∆, 4) progress requirement. However, when one of 
the three non-recovering nodes is intruded, ordering of 
client requests cannot progress even if the network 
delays are favorable. To avoid this blocking, [12] 
recommends that n = 3f+1+fc, and fc is the number of 
nodes subject to simultaneous recovery, which is 1. 
Having n=5 requires R ≤ 0.2 – adding stress on the 
Worm-hole whose required progress is (∆, 5).  
 
 
4R 4R 
4R     ii) 
   iii) 
   instance i    instance i+1 
R     i) 
 
Figure 3. Possible Schemes for WPR(4). 
 
In what follows, we model WPR having n = 4 and 
considering R ≤ 0.2; the latter allows blocking caused 
due to fc = 0, to be ignored. Moreover, we will assume 
that nodes are taken out for recovery in succession at 
the end of each epoch consuming a total of 4R – as 
shown in scheme ii). That is, each node disappears 
from S towards the end of each epoch for R of 
∆ duration and returns to S with any past exploitation 
fully undone.  
It is easy to see that WPR(4) becomes equivalent to 
DA(4) with R = 0; putting it differently, DA(4) in 
which each node is not exposed to attacks for a fraction 
R is equivalent to WPR(4). More precisely, each node 
is ‘visible’ to the adversary for the fraction of unit 
time: 
1z
z
−
 where 
1z
R
=  
Hence, (5) can be used with α and β appropriately 
adjusted to α’ and β’, as shown below:  
1
' 1 (1 )
z
zα α
−
= − − , 
1
' 1 (1 )
z
zβ β
−
= − −  
Nodes of S are executing in DA(n) throughout the 
epoch, while they are not in WPR(n). So, given that 
fatal intrusion does not occur, the performance of 
WPR(n) approaches that of DA(n), only when R → 0. 
So, for a fair comparison, we will consider 0.01 ≤R≤  
0.1, i.e., the Worm-hole fulfills a progress requirement 
of (∆, 10) to  (∆, 100)– an idealized version of 
WPR(n).  This will be the base against which 
tolerance-sustainability of replacement schemes will be 
judged. 
Finally, the choice of frequency of recovery in WPR 
can be easily adjusted by re-defining unit-time: as 
scheme iii) of Fig 3 indicates, the frequency is doubled 
by defining the unit-step as half of the original. Note 
that the Worm-hole needs to progress twice faster. 
 
5. Comparison of Tolerance Sustainability  
 
5.1. Experiment Set I. 
 
We denote the expected number of epochs before 
fatal intrusion as expected lifetime, or simply lifetime 
for short. This set of experiments compare, the 
expected life-times of DA(4), IA(4,3) and HA(4,4) 
against WPR(4). We consider the adversary to be 
potentially powerful.  
The comparison was made for the case that all 
nodes have vulnerabilities known to A, i.e., every node 
is a V-node. That is, the adversary is fully-informed 
(see Section 2.1). This makes the value of N irrelevant, 
as every node that is chosen from SF will already be 
vulnerable for A. Hence, DA(4) is evaluated using Eqn 
(5) with initial state to (N,4) for a large N;  IA(4,3) and 
HA(4,4) cases are simulated. 
We considered probabilities of exploitation (β) 
between 0.01 and 0.99. For WPR(4), R was varied 
from 0.01 to 0.1.  
In all of the cases considered, WPR(4) has a longer 
lifetime (i.e., suffers fatal intrusion later) than DA(4) 
which itself out-lives IA(4,3). HA(4,4) out-lives 
WPR(4) when exploitation probability β ≤ 0.21, and is 
out-lived by WPR(4) for higher β. 
Figure 4 shows the life-times for DA(4), IA(4,3). 
HA(4,4) as a percentage of the life-time obtained for 
WPR(4); the value of R in Figure 4 is 0.05. The results 
for other values of R in the chosen range follow a 
similar pattern.  
Results are not presented for β > 0.5 due to 
expected lifetimes becoming too small to make the 
system of any practical use, as shown in Table 1. Even 
for β = 0.2, the adversary appears too powerful to 
allow WPR(4) to last for more than 6 epochs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Life-times with only V-nodes (R = 0.05). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Expected Lifetimes for WPR(4). 
 
β WPR(4) Expected Lifetime 
0.01 2079.443027 
0.1 22.050111 
0.2 5.504875 
0.3 2.291555 
0.4 1.128330 
0.5 0.582690 
0.6 0.292314 
0.7 0.130775 
0.8 0.044630 
0.9 0.007301 
0.99 0.000016 
 
There is a trend of HA(4,3) out-performing WPR(4) 
by increasingly larger amounts as β decreases. The 
area between 0.1 and 0.01 also seems to be one that 
would be particularly relevant to practical applications 
as the expected number of epochs to failure is within a 
range that could be sufficient for a real system. 
What is surprising is that a value of β = 0.1 
represents a powerful adversary who could cause fatal 
intrusion within a maximum of 25 epochs, irrespective 
of the sustainability strategy used.   
 
5.2. Experiment Set II. 
 
We compared the expected lifetime of WPR(4) to 
that of DA(4) while varying the values of α and β and 
the percentage of nodes whose vulnerability was 
known to adversary at the start of the system. (This 
comparison was solely based on analytical estimations 
of Section 4.) We attempted in each case to find the 
value of N needed for DA(4) to last longer than 
WPR(4) which we call NTT (number to threshold). 
When the percentage of initially vulnerable nodes was 
≥ 80% we were unable to find such a value within the 
limit of 1000 nodes.  
 
Table 2. Minimum N for DA(4) to out-live 
WPR(4). 
% of 
Vulnerable 
Nodes 
NTT α = β 
= 0.1, χ 
=0.01 
NTT α = β 
= 0.2, χ 
=0.01 
NTT α = β 
=0.3, 
χ=0.01 
40 8 8 8 
50 8 8 8 
70 107 107 197 
80 >1000 >1000 >1000 
90 >1000 >1000 >1000 
When half or less than half of nodes in N are U-
nodes, a small threshold is enough for DA(4) to out-
live WPR(4). Note that, for β ≥ 0.1, the adversary 
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considered is quite powerful. Against moderately 
powerful adversaries, the life-times of DA(4) will be 
enhanced considerably with an affordable capacity of a 
server farm. This observation is encouraging and 
vindicates further investigation into replacement 
schemes.  
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Figure 5. Expected  Lifetime of DA(4) versus N. 
 
Figure 5 depicts results of estimations for 60% of 
total nodes being U-nodes initially.  Despite local 
variations, the expected lifetime of DA(4) increases as 
N increases. It may converge to a limit for very large 
N, but, below this limit, small changes in N brings a 
significant increase in the expected lifetime of DA(4). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper comprehensively investigates a novel, 
proactive replacement approach for sustaining the 
resilience of an intrusion-tolerance system.  Given a 
server-farm that houses ‘warm-spare’ machines, 
proactive replacement is achieved through 
implementable algorithms. Three replacement schemes 
have been proposed and their efficacy has been 
demonstrated through a preliminary study involving 
estimations and simulations. Study confirms that 
proactive replacement can improve system lifetimes 
with a reasonable size server farm, even when the 
adversary is moderately powerful.  
  
7. References 
 
[1] A.Z. Broder and D Dolev, “Flipping Coins In Many 
Pockets (Byzantine Agreement on Uniformly Random 
Values)”, 25th Annual Symposium on Foundations of 
Computer Science, 1984, pp. 157-170. 
 
[2] C. Cachin, K.Kurusawe, A.Lysyankaya and R Strobl, 
“Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing and Proactive 
Crypto systems”, Proc. 9th ACM Conf. on Computer and 
Comm. Security, November 2002, pp. 88-97. 
 
[3] M.Castro and B.Liskov, “Practical Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance and Proactive Recovery”, ACM Transactions on 
Computer Systems, 20(4), 2002, pp.398-461. 
 
[4] M.Castro and B.Liskov, “Practical Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance”, Third Symposium on Op Sys Design and 
Implementation (OSDI), New Orleans, 1999, pp. 173-186. 
  
[5] B.B.Madan, K.G.-Popstojanova, K.Vaidyanathan, and 
K.S.Trivedi, “A Method for Modelling and Quantifying the 
Security Attributes of Intrusion Tolerant Systems”, 
Performance Evaluation, Elsevier, 56, 2004, pp.167-186. 
 
[6]  R.Ortalo, Y.Deswarte, and M.Kaaniche, 
“Experimenting with Quantitative Evaluation Tools for 
Monitoring Operational Security”, IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, 25(5), 1999, pp. 633-650. 
[7]  M.Pease, R.Shostak and L.Lamport, “Reaching 
Agreement in the Presence of Faults”, JACM, vol. 27, pp. 
228-234, 1980. 
[8]  F.B. Schneider, “Implementing Fault-Tolerant 
Services Using the State Machine Approach: A Tutorial”, 
ACM Computing Surveys, 22(4), 1990, pp.299-319. 
 
[9] -, “Implementing Trustworthy Services Using State 
Machines”, IEEE Security and Privacy, 3(5), 2005, pp.34-43. 
 
[10] P.Sousa, N.F.Neves and P.Verissimo, “How Resilient 
are Distributed f Fault/Intrusion-Tolerant Systems?”, 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable 
Systems and Networks, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, 
DC, 2005, pp.98-107. 
 
[11] -, “Proactive resilience through architectural 
hybridization” In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on 
Applied Computing, Dijon, France, 2006, pp. 686-690. 
 
[12] – and W.H.Sanders, “Proactive Resilience Revisited: 
The Delicate Balance Between Resisting Intrusions and 
Remaining Available," 25th IEEE Symposium on Reliable 
Distributed Systems (SRDS), 2006, pp.71-82. 
 
[13] A. Shamir, “How to Share a Secret”, Commn. ACM, 22, 
pp.612-613, 1979. 
 
[14] P. Veríssimo and A. Casimiro, "The Timely Computing 
Base Model and Architecture," IEEE Transactions on 
Computers, 51(8), 2002, pp. 916-930. 
 
[15] P.Veríssimo, “Travelling through wormholes: a new 
look at distributed systems models”, SIGACT News, ACM, 
37(1), 2006, pp. 66-81. 
 
